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"Equality" is one of the great undefined terms underlying much
current controversy and antagonism. This one confused word might
even become the rock on which our civilization is wrecked. It should
be worth defining.
Equality is such an easily understood concept in mathematics that
we may not realize it is a bottomless pit of complexities anywhere
else. '
The argument I advance about equality2 can be stated as a syllogism:
(1) Major premise: Any concept in law or morals that is both
empty and confusing should be banished as an explanatory norm;
(2) Minor premise: The concept of "equality"is both empty
and confusing;
(3) Conclusion: Therefore, the concept of equality should be
banished as an explanatory norm.
The argument can be challenged in the usual ways. One can challenge
the major premise by denying that all empty and confusing concepts
should be banished from normative discourse. One can challenge the mi-
nor premise by denying that equality is an empty and confusing concept.
Or one can challenge both premises together.
Professor Steven Burton does none of these things, at least not directly.
Instead, he challenges the argument by replacing the major premise with
one he assumes I would want to accept, replacing the minor premise with
one he believes I would have to accept, and then suggesting that the prem-
ises combine to produce results I would never accept. The argument, as he
reformulates it, can also be stated as a syllogism:
(1') Major premise: Any concept in law or morals that is
empty should be banished as an explanatory norm;
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
1. Sowell, We're Not Really "Equal," NEWSWEEK, Sept. 7, 1981, at 13.
2. Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. REv. 537 (1982).
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(2') Minor premise: The concept of "rights" is empty;
(Y) Conclusion: Therefore, the concept of rights should be
banished as an explanatory norm.
Professor Burton presents the reformulated syllogism as a reductio ad
absurdum. He assumes that his major premise (1') is equivalent to (1).
He asserts that his minor premise (2') is as true as (2). He thus puts the
reader to the choice between either accepting both conclusions (3) and (Y)
or rejecting both (3) and (3'). He obliges the reader to choose between
either agreeing that "rights" should be banished or denying that "equal-
ity" should be banished. As he puts it:
We would have two choices if the idea of substantive rights . . .
were as empty as, and collapsed into, the concept of equality. We
could conclude that rules also should be "banished from legal and
moral discourse as an explanatory norm," or that neither concept
should be banished. ... 3
I disagree with Professor Burton's line of argument, but not for the
reasons he supposes. He assumes I accept his major premise but reject his
minor premise. In fact, my position is quite the opposite: I accept his
minor premise but not his major premise. I agree that the concept of
"rights" is an empty concept. Indeed, I thought I made it clear that
"rights" (like equality) is a "formal" or "rhetorical" device through
which one expresses anterior notions of right and wrong. The real differ-
ence between rights and equality is not that rights are substantive and
equality is formal, but that rights are a "useful" form of moral and legal
discourse, while equality is a confusing form of discourse. By the same
token, the real difference between Professor Burton and myself is not that
he thinks rights are empty and I think them substantive, but that we start
from different major premises and hence come to different conclusions. He
starts from the premise (or at least attributes to me the premise) that all
empty concepts should be avoided; and, hence, he concludes that rights
and equality must both be eschewed (or, alternatively, both be embraced).
I start from the narrower premise that all empty and confusing concepts
should be avoided; hence, I conclude that equality alone should be
eschewed.
Why would a reader as careful and perceptive as Professor Burton mis-
construe my argument about equality? What causes him to collapse "con-
fusion" into "emptiness"? Why does he assume that I would banish all
3. Burton, On "Empty Ideas," 91 YALE L.J. 1136, 1138 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
4. Westen, supra note 2, at 579 n.147.
1154
Vol. 91: 1153, 1982
On "Confusing Ideas"
empty ideas from moral and legal discourse? The answer, I suspect, is
that I failed to explain as well as I should what I mean by an "empty"
idea. I shall try again, therefore, to distinguish empty (or formal) ideas
from substantive ideas, and then to apply the distinction to the two con-
cepts of rights and equality.
I. What Are Empty Ideas?
I argue that equality is an empty concept. Professor Burton suggests
that rights are also empty. What do we mean by "empty"?
Equality is empty in the same way that a variable in a mathematical
formula is empty. Both are derivative in nature. Both can be made to
stand for any of a range of specified values, but neither has determinate
content of its own. The variable, x, in mathematics is used as a stand-in
for something else, whether it be a known value (e.g., the speed of light)
or an unknown value (e.g., the time it takes a train traveling at 100 miles
per hour to overtake a train that left two hours earlier traveling at 95
miles per hour). X itself, however, has no content apart from the specified
value for which it stands. X itself is "empty."
This "empty" formalism is a characteristic of many concepts in law and
morals. Consider the concept of freedom. Every statement of freedom has
both form and substance. The substance of the statement is the specifica-
tion of who in particular is unconstrained by what in particular to do or
be what in particular.' The form of the statement is the triadic relation-
ship of some agent, x, from some constraint, y, to do some activity or
nonactivity, z. It is a descriptive formula. It describes things as they are,
and is not a moral norm for prescribing what should be. It is a formula
for stating who is unrestrained by what to do what, not a prescription of
who ought to be (or ought not to be) free from what to do what. The
form of every statement of freedom is the same. The three variable terms
of the formula can encompass an almost infinite range of agents, an al-
most infinite range of constraints, and an almost infinite range of
activities.
5. This discussion of the concept of freedom relies heavily on Gerald MacCallum's seminal essay,
Negative and Positive Freedom, 76 PHIL. REV. 312 (1967). As he explains:
Whenever the freedom of some agent or agents is in question, it is always freedom from some
constraint or restriction on. . . doing, not doing, becoming, or not becoming something. Such
freedom is thus always of something (an agent or agents), from something, to do, not do,
become, or not do, become, or not become something; it is a triadic relation. Taking the format
'x is (is not) free from y to do (not do, become, not become) z, 'x ranges over agents, y ranges
over such "preventing conditions" as constraints, restrictions, interferences, and barriers, and z
ranges over actions or conditions of character or circumstance.
Id. at 314 (footnotes omitted).
6. See Cook, Coercion and Socal Change, in NOMOS XIV: COERCION 107, 122-23, 126-30 (J.
Chapman & J. Pennock eds. 1972) (descriptively, freedom neither good nor bad).
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Specific freedoms thus share a common logic or structure. Some free-
doms are good and lawful (e.g., the freedom of members of Congress from
the constraint of libel laws to speak and debate legislative matters); some
freedoms are bad and unlawful (e.g., the freedom of husbands from the
constraint of criminal penalties to beat their wives). To prescribe (or pro-
scribe) freedom requires something that the descriptive formula of free-
dom cannot supply: moral or legal standards by which to distinguish good
freedoms from bad freedoms, lawful freedoms from unlawful freedoms.
Once one possesses such moral or legal standards, one can insert them into
the formula, thereby transforming statements of freedom from descriptions
into prescriptions.
It follows, therefore, that the concept of freedom is an empty concept in
two significant respects. Descriptively, it is largely empty, because it is a
set of variable terms that must be further specified before one can know
who in particular is unconstrained by what in particular to do or to be
what in particular. Prescriptively, it is entirely emply, because it has noth-
ing at all to say about who ought (or ought not) to be free from what to
do or to be what. It can do nothing but incorporate by reference whatever
external normative standards may otherwise exist for distinguishing good/
lawful freedoms from bad/unlawful freedoms.7
A. Are Rights Empty?
The concept of rights differs from the concept of freedom in at least one
7. Concepts come in varying degrees of open-texturedness. The less the variable terms of a con-
cept are specified in advance, the more the concept can encompass by reference-and, hence, the more
the concept is open-textured or "empty." Conversely, the more the variable terms of a concept are
specified in advance, the less the concept can encompass by reference-and, hence, the less the concept
is empty. It follows, therefore, that as the contents of a concept are increasingly specified, the compass
of the concept is increasingly diminished, until the point is reached at which it can stand for only one
thing in the world. As that point approaches, the concept ceases to contain variable terms-and thus
ceases to be empty-and thus becomes indistinguishable from the one thing for which it stands. Con-
sider descriptive concepts in law and morals, such as freedom. Freedom is a triadic relationship of an
agent, X, from a constraint, Y, to engage in an activity, Z. The descriptive concept of freedom is
neither entirely empty nor entirely specified. It is not completely empty because its variable terms do
not stand for just anything; they stand for particular things-agents, constraints, and activities, respec-
tively. At the same time, freedom is not entirely specified either, because X, Y, and Z are variables:
they can be made to stand for any agent, any constraint, and any activity, respectively. In short,
descriptive freedom is more or less empty. Freedom would be emptier than it now is, if one or more of
its variable terms were changed to encompass more than they now do (e.g., by changing X to stand for
any agent or thing). Conversely, freedom would be less empty than it now is, if one or more of its
terms were changed to encompass less than they now do (e.g., by changing Y to stand for any man-
made constraint).
The significant thing about equality and inequality is that prescriptively they are entirely empty.
(Prescriptively, the same is also true of freedom.) To say two or more things are equal or unequal
means that they are identical or nonidentical by reference to a given standard of meaurement, X. X is
completely open-textured. It can stand for any standard of measurement, whether descriptive or pre-
scriptive; and among the latter, it can stand for any prescriptive standard. That is what it means to
say that equality and inequality are wholly "erhpty." See infra note 22.
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significant respect. The concept of freedom is a set of variable terms that
can encompass either descriptive or prescriptive relationships. One can say
"cpeople are free to commit suicide whenever they wish," or "people
should be (or should not be) free to commit suicide whenever they wish."
The first statement expresses an "is"; the latter expresses an "ought."
The concept of rights, in contrast, is exclusively prescriptive. It is always a
form of normative discourse, always a way of making "ought" statements.
It does not follow, however, that because rights express norms they are
also a source of norms. Some normative concepts are entirely derivative.
An example is the concept of justice, which is defined as suum
cuique-"to each his due."' So defined, justice is a wholly open-textured
norm: it prescribes that everyone be given his or her due, but does not
itself specify anyone's due. It does nothing but incorporate by reference
whatever moral or legal standards may otherwise exist for determining
dues. It is a prescriptive formula consisting of a key variable term, "due,"
into which external standards of right and wrong must be inserted to give
the term content. "Justice" has no meaning apart from those standards of
right and wrong; it is simply a summary abstraction of whatever such
moral or legal standards happen to be.
The same is also true of rights. Alf Ross, in a famous and brilliant
essay,' demonstrates that "rights" is an "empty"1 word, a word "without
meaning" and "without any semantic reference."" Rights are a rhetorical
"tool" or "technique" 1 for expressing moral and legal rules. The rules
take the following form: if an agent has or does or is y (the conditioning
fact), he shall then be entitled to z (the conditioned normative conclusion).
To talk about "rights" is to talk about the connection between particular
conditioning facts and particular conditioned normative conclusions. One
can express the connection directly by simply saying: "if a person has or
does or is y, he or she shall then be entitled to z." Or one can insert the
concept of rights as an interface between the two terms of the rule:
(1) If a person has or does or is y, he or she shall have a right;
(2) If a person has a right, he or she shall be entitled to z.1'
8. See Kelsen, Aristotle's Doctrine of Justice, in WHAT IS JUSTICE? 110, 128 (1957) (Aristotle's
definition of distributive justice "but a mathematical formulation of well-known principle suum
cuique, to each his own, or to each his due"); see also id. at 136 (formula "[t]o every one his due" an
"empty tautology").
9. Ross, T-Td, 70 HARV. L. REV. 812 (1957).
10. Id. at 818.
11. Id. at 821.
12. Id. at 825.
13. Id. at 817-18.
1157
The Yale Law Journal
The meaning of the term "rights" shifts between (1) and (2). It is used in
(1) as a stand-in for the other half of the rule-the conditioned normative
conclusion contained in (2); it is used in (2) as a substitute for the first
half of the rule-the conditioning fact contained in (1). Together the two
terms do nothing but "connect" the conditioning fact to the conditioned
normative conclusion.
t4
It follows, therefore, that the term "rights" has no prescriptive content
of its own. It is a rhetorical "technique of presentation,"" 5 a way of refer-
ring to the connection between certain conditioning facts and certain con-
ditioned normative consequences. The term "rights" has nothing at all to
say about what facts should (or should not) lead to what normative con-
clusions. It can do nothing but incorporate by reference whatever norma-
tive rules already obtain.
Rights are therefore empty in the same way as justice. Nevertheless, it
does not follow that rights and justice should be banished from normative
discourse, because it does not follow that either of them is useless. There
is no necessary connection between the emptiness of a concept and its use-
fulness. Some concepts, like variable terms in mathematical formulas, are
useful precisely because they are empty. Ross makes precisely that argu-
ment in favor of rights. Although rights is "an empty word," 6 he says it is
useful "technique of presentation"17 that enables us "to achieve clarity and
order in a complicated series of legal rules.""8
B. Is Equality Empty?
Equality is empty in the same ways in which freedom is empty. Like
freedom, equality is a formula that can encompass descriptive relation-
ships as well as prescriptive relationships. Descriptively, equality and
freedom are empty because they contain variable terms that must be filled
in to give them descriptive content. Prescriptively, equality and freedom
14. Id. at 817-19.
15. Id. at 822.
This is not to deny that the term "rights" can also be used more narrowly as a term of art for
prescriptive claims of a certain sort, such as claims of particular importance or force. See, e.g., Regan,
Glosses on Dworkin: Rights, Principles, and Policies, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1213, 1214-34 (1978) (dis-
cussing Ronald Dworkin's usage of "rights" to refer to prescriptive claims that have sufficient force to
"trump" other prescriptive claims). I use "rights" the way it appears in the Equal Rights Amend-
ment-to refer generically to prescriptive legal claims of all sorts, whether they have their source in
organic law, statute, judicial opinion, or custom. See Westen, supra note 2, at 540-41 nn.1 1-12.
16. Ross, supra note 9, at 818.
17. Id. at 825.
18. Id. at 821; see also id. at 819. But c. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional
Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 632 (1981) (noting that the conclusory rhetoric of "rights"
may skew constitutional discourse by suggesting that constitutional values are present on only one side
or the other of constitutional questions); Churchill & Siman, Abortion and the Rhetoric of Individual
Rights, HA-STINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1982, at 9 (suggesting that rhetoric of "rights" skews moral
and legal discourse by begging very questions at issue).
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are empty because they have nothing at all to say about which relation-
ships are good and which are bad, which are lawful and which are un-
lawful. They are formulas through which one can express prescriptive
standards of right and wrong, but they do not themselves specify such
standards.
The essential task is to define the term equality. We can begin with
descriptive equality. To say that two persons or things are descriptively
equal cannot mean that they are descriptively identical in every respect,
for no two persons or things can ever be identical in every respect.19 Nor
does equal mean that two persons or things are descriptively identical in
some particular respect, for all persons and things are identical in some
respects. Thus, to say two persons or things are descriptively equal means
that they are identical in relevant respects-"relevant" being defined by
reference to a given descriptive standard. 20 To say two persons or things
are descriptively unequal means that they are nonidentical in the relevant
descriptive respect.
It follows, therefore, that statements of equality and inequality presup-
pose standards of measurement.2 The ideas of equality and inequality
relate the consequences of applying one standard as opposed to another,
but the ideas do not themselves specify particular standards of measure-
ment. They are empty variables into which one may insert whatever de-
scriptive standards one wishes to apply.
The same analysis also governs prescriptive equality. The idea, or defi-
nition, of equality is the same in both cases: equality is the relationship of
relevant identity that obtains between two or more persons or things by
reference to a given standard of measurement. Prescriptive equality differs
from descriptive equality only with respect to the content of the given
standard. Descriptive equality is the relationship of relevant identity that
obtains between two or more persons or things by reference to a descrip-
tive standard-a standard for measuring things as they are. Prescriptive
19. Leibnitz, in his famous principle of the identity of indiscernibles, demonstated that there can
be no two things in the universe that are exactly alike. See W. RABINOWITZ, UNIVERSALIZABILITY 24,
113-14 (1979).
20. "Whether or not persons or things are equal depends in part on the scales used to compare
them. Two distances may be the same when measured in miles, but different when measured with a
micrometer." Evans, Equality, Ambiguity and Public Choice, 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1385, 1393
(1981). See also Bedau, Egalitarianism and the Idea of Equality, in NOMOS IX: EQUALITY 3, 7-8 (3.
Chapman & J. Pennock eds. 1967).
Elizabeth Wolgast takes the position, which I find entirely persuasive, that statements of equality
and inequality logically presuppose an additional element, namely that the two or more persons or
things being declared "equal" or "unequal" both be capable of measurement by the given descriptive
standard. See E. WOLGAST, EQUALITY AND THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN 37-39 (1980).
21. "We can only call two things similar in virtue of some rule or criterion of similarity. Thus,
whether two objects are the same color depends on what we count as 'the same color.'" J. WILSON,
EQUALITY 41 (1966).
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equality is the relationship of relevant identity that obtains between two
or more persons by reference to a prescriptive standard-a standard for
measuring persons as they ought to be.
This can be illustrated by reference to the moral and legal issue of
achieving "equality" in the payment of wages and salaries. Assume the
following case:
A company employs three persons, A, B, and C. The three employ-
ees all work identical hours and perform identical tasks. Yet they do
so in varying circumstances. A and B both have the same amount of
seniority in the company, but they have less seniority than C. B and
C both possess the same degree of skill, but they possess less skill
than A. C and A are both the same age, but they are younger than
B. The company is uncertain as to how it should pay the three em-
ployees for their work. Accordingly it puts the following question to
its general counsel: "Are A, B, and C morally or legally equal for
salary purposes?"
The answer obviously depends on the content of the moral or legal
standard that governs the payment of salaries. If the legal or moral rules
of the society prescribe that salaries be based on the number of hours
worked or on the nature of the tasks performed, then it follows that A, B,
and C are "prescriptively equal. If, on the other hand, the society adheres
to another moral or legal rule-seniority, skill, or age for example-for
calculating salaries, the three employees are not prescriptively equal. The
equality and inequality of A, B, and C are the consequential relationships
of identity and nonidentity that obtain among them as a result of applying
one prescriptive rule for salaries as opposed to another.
Like freedom, therefore, equality and inequality are prescriptively
empty. They relate the consequences of applying normative rules to two
or more persons, but they do not themselves supply or specify particular
norms. They are formal relationships among persons that depend on a
variable prescriptive standard that must be filled in to give them actual
content. That is what philosophers mean in saying that, prescriptively, the
idea of equality is "formal," 2 "derivative, . 3 "consequential"2 ' and "vacu-
ous" 25-in short, empty.26
22. J. FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 100 (1973); C. PERELMAN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE AND THE
PROBLEMOF ARGUMENT 11-29 (1963); Locke, The Trivializability of Universalizability, 77 PHIL. 25
(1968).
23. Flathman, Equality and Generalization, A Formal Analysis, in NOMoS IX: EQUALITY 38, 51
(J. Chapman & J. Pennock eds. 1967).
24. Brown, Nonegalitarian Justice, 56 AUSTRALIAN J. PHIL. 48, 52 (1978).
25. J. REES, EQUALITY 95-96 (1971); Wollheim, Equality and Equal Rights, in JUSTICE AND
SOCIAL POLICY 111, 116 (F. Olafson ed. 1961).
26. J. HARRISON, HUME'S THEORY OF JUSTICE 197 (1981); P. POLYVIOU, THE EQUAL PROTEC-
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II. Is Professor Burton Correct that Rights Derive from Equality?
I argue that statements of prescriptive equality logically collapse into
simpler and anterior statements of rights. The reason for this should be
apparent. To say that two persons are prescriptively equal is to presup-
pose a prescriptive standard or rule of treatment by reference to which
they are identical. Their moral or legal equality is the logical consequence
of the fact that the prescriptive rule deems them to be indistinguishable
for its purposes. Take the statement that "men and women are legally
equal with respect to voting." The statement presupposes a legal rule or
right by which they are indistinguishable=--that is, a legal rule to the ef-
fect that "no person shall be restrained from voting on grounds of sex."
Without such a legal rule, no relationship of legal equality among men
and women can be ascertained. With such a legal rule, their legal equality
ensues automatically.
Professor Burton takes the opposite position. Equality is not based on
rights. Rights, he says, are based on equality. This is so for two reasons.
First, equality cannot be based on rights or rules because, at common law,
judges have "no authority to enact . . . general rule[s]."2' A court may
announce a rule to explain its decision, but the announcement is nothing
TION OF THE LAWS 7 (1980); Carr, The Concept of Formal Justice, 39 PHIL. STUD. 211, 212 (1981);
Honore, Social Justice, 8 McGILL L.J. 77, 83 (1962).
It should be apparent by now that Professor Burton and I are using "empty" to mean very different
things. By empty, I mean "derivative": equality is morally and legally empty, I say, because rather
than being an independent prescriptive norm, equality can do nothing but incorporate by reference
prescriptive norms that obtain independently of it. In contrast, Professor Burton uses empty to mean
"empirically unverifiable": rights are empty, he would say, because like all moral concepts, rights
cannot be derived from-or reduced to-empirically verifiable facts.
This difference in usage produces confusion of two distinct kinds. First, the different ways Professor
Burton and I use "empty" may create the impression that we agree where, in reality, we may not
agree at all. Thus, by declaring rights to be empty, Professor Burton appears to agree with me when I
say rights are empty; yet he uses empty so differently that he may not in fact agree with what I mean
in saying rights are empty, viz., that "rights" are a formula for expressing anterior normative judg-
ments that are and must be capable of being expressed otherwise.
Second, and quite the opposite, the different ways we use empty may create the impression that we
disagree where, in reality, we may not disagree at all. Thus, Professor Burton assumes that we disa-
gree about the significance of emptiness. He assumes that I would banish empty concepts from moral
and legal discourse, while he would retain them. I have already suggested that he is incorrect in his
assumption-that I do not regard emptiness as a sufficient reason for banishing concepts from norma-
tive discourse. But even if he were correct, the disagreement could easily be explained by the fact that
emptiness (and, hence, the significance of emptiness) mean very different things to him than they do to
me. He wishes to retain empty concepts, because emptiness (as he uses it) is a feature that pertains to
all moral and legal norms-i.e., that prescriptive norms are empirically unverifiable. If I wished to
banish empty concepts, it would be because emptiness (as I use it) is a feature that pertains to only
some prescriptive norms-Le., norms that are derivative expressions of anterior prescriptive judgments
that are more clearly and accurately expressed directly. In short, if Professor Burton used emptiness
the way I do-or if I used emptiness the way he does-we might discover (for all we know) that we
are in substantial agreement regarding both the content of rights and equality and their rhetorical
significance.
27. Burton, supra note 3, at 1143.
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more than an "opinion" or "dictum" 8 as to what the rule really is. The
opinion is always a dictum, because it is always "open to reinterpretation"
and to "overruling" 9 by judges in subsequent cases. A judge may an-
nounce the rule "as if it has always been what it has come to be," but that
is a "fiction."3 The announced "rule" is not a principle on which equal-
ity can be based, because the rule cannot be said really to exist until the
original judge announces it, and it cannot be said to survive after subse-
quent judges have revised or overruled it.
Professor Burton, it seems to me, confuses the existence of judge-made
rules with their longevity. Obviously, judge-made rules do not begin to
exist until they are announced, and they do not continue to exist after they
have been revised or overruled. The same is also true of legislation: legis-
lative rules do not begin to exist until some legislature announces them,
and they do not continue to exist after subsequent legislatures have revised
them or repealed them. That legislative and judge-made rules are revis-
able-and hence, potentially ephemeral-does not mean, however, that
they do not exist. Judge-made rules exist as legal norms until the time
comes (if ever) that a subsequent court is willing and able either to over-
rule them or to replace them with alternative rules that are fully consis-
tent with previous decisions. Some judge-made rules, such as the constitu-
tional rule of judicial review in Marbury v. Madison,3 continue to govern
unrevised for long periods of time. As long as they continue unrevised,
they provide prescriptive standards by which persons are rendered pre-
scriptively equal and unequal.
Professor Burton's second argument is more subtle. Equality cannot be
based on rights or rules, he says, because rights and rules are themselves
the product of reasoning based on the principle of equality. Judge-made
rules do not exist ex ante as "'fixed prior rule[s].' "I' They "'arise out of
a process' "" of legal reasoning. Legal reasoning, in turn, is reasoning by
"analogy"3 4 and by " 'example' "3 -that is, by searching for prior decided
cases or hypothetical cases that are legally "like"36 the case at hand. Hav-




31. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). Professor Van Alstyne has identified a number of features of
Marbury that would have permitted subsequent courts to construe it more narrowly than Chief Jus-
tice Marshall originally framed it. See Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969
DUKE L.J. 1, 34-38.
32. Burton, supra note 3, at 1143 (quoting E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 3
(1948)).
33. Id. at 1144 (quoting E. LEVI, supra note 32, at 4).
34. Id. at 1143.
35. Id. at 1143 (quoting from E. LEVI, supra note 32, at 1).
36. Burton, supra note 3, at 1144.
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respects, the court first decides to resolve the instant case similarly, then
formulates a rule of decision that is consistent with its prior decisions. The
announced rule of decision thus comes after the process of "analogical
reasoning"3 7 by which the court decides the case. Since analogical reason-
ing "necessarily appeal[s] to ... the equality principle,"' 8 it fol-
lows-Professor Burton would say-that rules of decision are the product
of anterior concepts of equality.
Unfortunately, Professor Burton makes the same mistake that his men-
tor, Edward H. Levi, made in his influential Introduction to Legal Rea-
soning." Burton and Levi assume that in reasoning by analogy a person
first identifies legally relevant similarities and then formulates a legal rule
to explain the similarities. In reality the process of reasoning is precisely
the opposite. One can never declare A to be legally similar to B without
first formulating the legal rule of treatment by which they are rendered
relevantly identical. Why? Because that is what the terms legally similar,
equal, the same, and alike mean. They mean that A and B are prescrip-
tively identical by reference to a given prescriptive rule of treatment.
For example, is the act of hanging the Governor in effigy legally like or
unlike hanging one's spouse? Obviously, the two acts are alike by some
descriptive standards and unalike by other descriptive standards. By the
same token, the two acts of hanging are prescriptively alike by reference
to some prescriptive standards (e.g., by reference to a rule that "any adult
who hangs a living person by the neck shall be guilty of a felony"), and
unalike by reference to other prescriptive standards (e.g., by reference to
the rule that "any adult who hangs either a living person or the represen-
tation of a living person by the neck until dead shall be guilty of a fel-
ony"). To decide whether the two acts are really similar or dissimilar in
law, one must make a legal judgment as to which of the two hypothetical
prescriptive rules should prevail. Before one has identified the prevailing
legal rule, one has no way of knowing whether the acts are legally similar
or dissimilar. After one has identified the prevailing rule, the similarities
or dissimilarities of the two acts follow as a logical consequence: their
similarity or dissimilarity-their equality or inequality-is simply another
way of saying that they either do or do not both fully satisfy the terms of
the prevailing rule.40
37. Id. at 1143.
38. Id. at 1141.
39. See E. LEVI, supra note 32, at 1-4.
40.
So the relevance of [an] analogy is dependent upon perceiving a rational principle within
which the two items compared can both be contained. ...
This explanation further indicates why no clear line of distinction can be drawn between
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It goes without saying that the formulation of legal rules to govern cer-
tain persons in certain ways is a normative process. Logic alone cannot
derive a moral or legal rule from an amoral premise: one cannot infer an
"ought" from an "is." The choice of one prescriptive rule over an-
other-and, hence, one prescriptive equality over another-is a moral, not
a logical, decision. Logic comes into play only after one formulates a rule
prescribing that certain persons be treated in certain ways; it then logi-
cally follows that the persons are either identical or nonidentical to one
another for purposes of the prescribed treatment. Their prescriptive
equality or inequality follows logically from their relative treatment under
the rule, because that is what prescriptive equality and inequality mean.4 '
Conclusion
Equality is a normatively formal concept through which one asserts
normative standards that originate elsewhere. The same is also true of
other formal concepts, such as freedom, justice, and rights. Some formal
concepts facilitate moral and legal discourse by virtue of their capacity to
argument from legal principle and argument from analogy. Analogies only make sense if there
are reasons of principle underlying them.
N. MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 163, 186 (1978) (emphasis added).
41. I am afraid that much of Professor Burton's discussion in Part I, B.1. and Part II. A. of his
essay is based on a misperception of my views regarding the nature of prescriptive rules. He evidently
understands me to be arguing that prescriptive rules can (somehow) be logically derived from-or
reduced to-purely nonmoral descriptive premises. I am sorry that he has come away with that im-
pression, because I thought I made it clear that I believe precisely the opposite. See Westen, supra
note 2, at 544 n.23. I believe, like Benn and Peters, that "doing justice calls for decision-making, not
calculation: we have to decide what is relevant, and what consequences ought to follow-and though
we decide according to rule, we are still doing something different from arithmetic." S. BENN & R.
PETERS, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 124 (1959); see Westen, supra note 2, at 549 n.40
("statements of equality presuppose the presence of empirical traits that we decide ought to carry
certain moral consequences") (emphasis added); see also Allen, A Critique of Gewirth's Is-Ought
Derivation, 92 ETHICS 211 (1982); Holmes, Frankena on "Ought" and "Is," 64 MONIST 394 (1981).
This means that Professor Burton and I are not as far apart in his views as he assumes. Though I am
not sure I fully understand everything Professor Burton says in Part II. A. of his essay, I am sure that
I fully agree that "legal rules" are "moral concepts," not purely descriptive statements.
What, then, is the source of Professor Burton's misperception? Why does he take me to be arguing
that prescriptive rules are exclusively the products of logic and description. The answer, I think, is
that he confuses the origin of prescriptive rules with their consequences. The origin of prescriptive
rules is necessarily normative in nature: one cannot decide whether A, B, and C should be treated in
certain ways without adjudging how the world ought to be (as opposed to how the world is). At the
same time, however, the formal relationships of equality or inequality that obtain among A, B, and C
as a consequence of deciding that they be treated in certain ways are necessarily logical or analytical
in nature: logically speaking A, B, and C are either identical to one another for purposes of the rule of
treatment (and hence, "equal") or nonidentical for purposes of the rule (and, hence, "unequal"). The
relationships of equality or inequality that obtain among them are an analytical consequence of the
prior normative judgment as to how they should be treated. Professor Burton thus confuses what I say
about the consequences of moral rules with what I do not say (or, at least, do not intend to say) about
the origin of moral rules. He assumes that, because I declare the formal consequences of moral rules
to be analytic, I must also declare the origin of moral rules to be purely analytic. But, of course, that
conclusion does not follow from that premise, and I do not mean to say it does.
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incorporate diverse normative standards by reference without distorting
their content. The trouble with equality is that it tends to mask the sub-
stantive normative standards it incorporates by reference and, hence, to
confuse moral and legal discourse.
That is why Thomas Sowell can say that equality is such "an easily
understood concept in mathematics" and yet so complex anywhere else.42
Equality itself is always the same-it is the relationship of relevant iden-
tity between two or more persons or things by reference to a standard of
measurement. The difference between equality in mathematics and equal-
ity in morals is the degree to which people agree on the relevant standard
of measurement. Equality is clear and simple in mathematics because, in
agreeing to play the game of mathematics, we implicitly commit ourselves
to the rule that identities and nonidentities should always be governed by
reference to number-that is, that the left side of a mathematical equation
shall equal the right side whenever they are identical in their numerical
sum. In contrast, equality is elusive in law and morals because we do not
(and, perhaps, cannot) agree on the normative rules by which people
should be governed. We use the word "equality" in law and morals as if
it stood for a common norm (as it does in mathematics), without realizing
that we are surreptitiously asserting diverse and sometimes conflicting
moral and legal norms. Equality conceals the diverse nature of the norma-
tive standards it incorporates by reference and, by masking them, becomes
"a bottomless pit of complexities. '4
42. See Sowell, supra note 1, at 13.
43. Id.
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